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WISDOM ACROSS THE ATLANTIC: 
North America and the European Experience 
by Paul Stanton KibeI 
Human rights and environmental protection were among the most controversial issues discussed 
during the national debate over ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).l 
Many of NAFTA's critics feared that the agreement would encourage NAFTA nations to attract and 
retain investment by lowering the cost of doing business.2 According to NAFTA's critics, this would 
result in downward harmonization of worker and environmental standards, and a race to the bottom. To 
lure investors, labor unions would be suppressed to keep wages down, worker safety standards would 
be reduced, and environmental protection requirements would be relaxed or ignored.3 
Although NAFTA was ratified in December 1993, many of its critics' predictions have proven 
true. In 1995, the Washington D.C. based Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) released a comprehensive 
report entitled NAFTA's First Year. IPS reported that, since the agreement's adoption, there has been 
a demonstrable decline in environmental protection and workers' rights in all ofNAFTA's countries, 
including the United States. In the United States, perhaps the most visible sign of this decline has been 
the recent Congressional effort to lower environmental stan-
dards to increase "international competitiveness."4 
The European experience 
teaches one basic lesson. To 
achieve just and sustainable 
trade policies, international 
regimes must possess the 
authority to implement human 
rights and environmental 
As Canada, the United States, and Mexico confront the 
human rights and environmental consequences ofNAFT A, they 
might seek guidance from another regional trade regime - the 
European Union (EU). As an older trade regime, the EU has 
already encountered and attempted to resolve many of the 
problems currently facing NAFTA. The European experience 
measures. 
teaches one basic lesson. To achieve just and sustainable trade 
policies, international regimes must possess the authority to 
implement human rights and environmental measures.5 Unfortunately, NAFTA now lacks this 
authority. . 
NAFTA's Narrow Focus 
In its present form, NAFT A is primarily an agreement, not a political institution. It is a document 
that seeks to protect and promote the unregulated transnational trade of goods among Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico. It does so by prohibiting certain types of trade restrictions, such as subsidies, import 
tariffs, and quantitative import restrictions.6 The institutions created to implement NAFT A, such as 
dispute resolution panels, possess only negative powers. These tribunals can determine that a NAFT A 
signatory is in violation of the agreement, but they cannot propose or adopt new international standards.7 
Moreover, formal complaints can only be brought by national governments, not by private citizens or 
non-governmental organizations.8 
NAFTA's side agreements on labor and the environment suffer similar and even more pro-
nounced institutional weaknesses. Under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC)9 and the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC),1O intern a-
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tional commissions are established to determine whether NAFf A's signatory countries are suppressing 
labor rights or lowering environmental standards to attract investment. Such actions are prohibited under 
the tenus of the side agreements. 
As with the NAFf A dispute panels, however, the NAALC and NAAEC commissions cannot 
propose or adopt new international standards. Their power is limited to investigating alleged violations. 
In some respects, these commissions are even weaker than NAFfA's panels. They are not even 
empowered to directly impose penalties, issue injunctions or revoke free trade privileges when a 
violation has been identified.!1 
In short, NAFf A and its side agreements are all focused on one primary goal - to preserve 
unregulated transnational trade. There are no institutions under NAFf A capable of moving proactively, 
of creating new binding standards that could bring human rights and environmental concerns into the 
regional economic planning process. The narrowness of the NAFTA regime has hindered the creation 
of a just and sustainable trade policy in North America. Recent developments in Canada and Mexico 
illustrate the regime's shortcomings. 
In Canada, the temperate rainforests of British Columbia (B.C.) are being logged at an 
environmentally unsustainable pace, degrading watersheds and destroying critical habitat for numerous 
endangered species.12 In the North American environmental community, there is widespread recogni-
tion that this logging is in violation of B.C:, federal Canadian and international environmentallaw.!3 
B. C. unwillingness to enforce its own environmental laws, which lowers the Canadian timber industry's 
There are no institutions under NAFTA 
capable of moving proactively, of 
creating new binding standards that 
could bring human rights and 
environmental concerns into the 
regional economic planning process. 
business costs, is also placing pressure to lower 
forest protection standards here in the U.S. 
Current forest practices in British Columbia would 
appear to constitute a violation of both NAFf A and 
the NAAEC. NAFfA states that it is inappropriate 
"to encourage investment by relaxing health, safety 
or environmental measures."14 NAAEC requires 
that each country "effectively enforce its environ-
mental laws and regulations." 15 While these guaran-
tees sound good on paper, there are no institutions to effectively implement these provisions. Under 
NAFf A and theNAAEC, the most environmentalists can do is request that aside agreement commission 
undertake an investigation. 
In Mexico, the 1994 Chiapas uprising illustrates the NAFf A regime' s impact on human rights. 16 
For several decades, indigenous groups in Mexico have been struggling to maintain their communities 
and traditional farming rights from encroachment by the Mexican national government. In 1982, the 
Mexican government launched a program to modernize agriculture, and began leasing formerly 
traditional farmland to the highest bidder. This often meant indigenous communities were displaced by 
large multinational agribusiness operations. Indigenous efforts to organize themselves as legitimate 
labor, humans rights, and political groups were routinely suppressed by the Mexican government. 
On January 1, 1994, the same day that NAFfA went into effect, the Zapista Army of National 
Liberation occupied several towns in Chiapas, Mexico. They issued a declaration calling NAFf A a 
"death sentence for indigenous people." Although the Chiapas uprising was put down, many unan-
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swered questions remain.!7 Should U.S. business interests be a party to the Mexico's continuing 
suppression oflabor and human rights? Should there be new North American institutions or provisions 
to ensure that foreign investment does not lead to the extinction of indigenous cultures? The NAFTA 
regime, with its focus on preserving free trade, is ill-equipped to ask, let alone answer, these questions. 
Lessons From the European Experience 
The European trade regime began with a limited economic mandate quite similar to that of 
NAFrA. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome created the European Community (EC) to help reduce trade 
barriers and encourage regional economic development.18 Unlike NAFrA, however, the Treaty of 
Rome created more than a list of prohibitions. It created four new multinational political institutions: 
the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council of Ministers, and the 
European Court of Justice. Collectively, these institutions possessed the power not oply to determine 
violations, but to adopt new all-European standards, called "regulations" or "directives". Under EC law, 
regulations are directly enforceable as national law in EC nations. Directives set forth legal obligations, 
but call upon EC nations to adopt their own implementing legislation. 
Although the EC institutions initially focused on regulating trade and competition, they soon 
expanded into other related areas. EC regulations and directives were adopted relating to the rights of 
workers to organize politically, the labeling of hazardous substances, airpollution from industrial plants, 
and drinking water quality. The EC's authority to adopt these regional standards was based on two 
provisions in the Treaty of Rome: Article 100, which authorizes EC legislation that "directly affects the 
establishment or functioning of the common market", and Article 235, which authorized actions 
"necessary for a community objective." 
In the area of labor and human rights, Europe has adopted several important measures. First, the 
EC's 1989 Social Charter expressly provides workers the right of association to constitute professional 
organizations or trade unions to defend their economic and social interests. 19 The Social Charter further 
provides that every worker shall have the freedom to join - or not to join - such organizations without 
the threat of any personal or occupational disadvantage. Second, the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms protects citizens' right to free speech and 
assembly, and protects ethnic and religious minorities from discrimination by national governments.20 
These agreements are more than mere aspirational documents; they have been given teeth through 
implementing directives and rulings by national and international courts. 
In the environmental field, the 1987 Single European Act21 and the 1991 Maastricht Treaty22 
expanded theEC' s law-making powers. These treaties also changed theEC to the European Union (EU). 
Article 130 of the Single European Act established several new objectives for the EU, including "to 
preserve, protect, and improve the quality of the environment" and to "contribute toward protecting 
human health." The Maastricht Treaty provided the EU with additional powers to "ensure a prudent and 
rational utilization of natural resources" and to "promote, at the international level, measures to deal with 
regional or worldwide environmental problems." Moreover, in 1991 a European Environmental Agency 
(headquartered in Copenhagen, Denmark) was established to collect information on environmental 
protection, and to help monitor national compliance with EU directives and regulations.23 
In addition to these integrative treaties, directives, and institutions, Europe has also created an 
effective forum to enforce human rights and environmental guarantees - the European Court of Justice 
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(ECl). Unlike the trade tribunals under NAFTA or the commissions under NAFTA' s side agreements, 
the ECJ has jurisdiction over all disputes arising under EU law. 24 Moreover, the ECJ grants standing 
not only to national governments, but to private citizens and non-governmental organizations as well.25 
The ECJ's broad jurisdiction and liberal standing have given teeth to the EU's human rights and 
environmental provisions. 
For instance, in the 1987 case UNECTEFv. Heylens, theECJ ruled that unreasonable restrictions 
on a worker's right to relocate and change jobs violate EU law.26 As another example, in the 1988 case 
European Commission v. Denmark, theECJ held that national laws promoting environmental protection 
are consistent with the EU's trade rules.27 
By expanding the types of issues it may regulate, and by creating institutions that enable the 
What is needed is a North American 
institution with the broad objectives 
and legislative powers of the 
European Union - perhaps a North 
American Union (NAU). 
creation of new human rights and environmental 
standards, the ED has developed into something much 
more than a mere free trade agreement. From its 
initial inception in 1957 as a vehicle to promote 
unregulated transnational trade, the ED has matured 
into a comprehensive multinational institution. It 
now has the power and means to integrate humans 
rights and environmental protection in Europe' s larger 
economic framework. 28 
The Quest for Just and Sustainable Trade in North America 
To deal with the human rights and environmental protection issues raised by transnational trade, 
Canada, the United States, and Mexico need to develop an integrated, comprehensive framework. The 
foundation of this framework should not be an unyielding adherence to regional free trade. Rather, it 
should be the principle of just and sustainable economic development. Because of its narrow free trade 
focus and its institutional weaknesses, the NAFTA regime currently cannot provide this framework. 
What is needed is a North American institution with the broad objectives and legislative powers 
of the European Union - perhaps a North American Union (NAU). In the context of an NAU, NAFTA 
would not be the regional "constitution" upon which all future efforts must comply. Rather, NAFTA 
would simply be one aspect, one legislative component, of the NAU's larger mandate. Under an NAD 
type framework, treaties like the NAALC and the NAAEC would possess the same authority as NAFT A, 
and would not be treated as subordinate or side agreements. Moreover, the new regime would provide 
an effective political forum for addressing other non-free trade issues, and for proposing new regional 
initiatives. 
The creation of an NAU with broad powers cannot happen overnight. As the evolution of the 
European Union demonstrates, nations are understandably reluctant to delegate law-making authority 
to untested international institutions.29 This delegation or sharing of legal authority is often viewed as 
a threat to national sovereignty. However, if international institutions are responsive to the needs of 
citizens, and if they lead to more just and sustainable policies, this national reluctance can be overcome. 
For North America, the first step is to move beyond the narrowness ofNAFT A, and to lay the foundation 
for a more comprehensive and democratic regional regime. 
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Canada, the United States, and Mexico should learn from Europe' s experience. As the European 
Court of Justice declared in the 1985 case Procureur de la Republique v. ADBHU, "the principle of 
freedom of trade is not to be viewed in absolute terms but is subject to certain limits justified by the 
objectives of general interest pursued by the Community."30 
The creation of a new North American institution with a 
similar broad mandate is the best means to ensure that human 
rights and environmental protection are part of the region's 
development agenda. 
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